A Tangled Mass: The Android Root Certificate Stores

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The security of todays Web rests in part on the set of X.509 certificate authorities trusted by each users browser. Users generally do not themselves configure their browsers root store but instead rely upon decisions made by the suppliers of either the browsers or the devices upon which they run. In this work we explore the nature and implications of these trust decisions for Android users. Drawing upon datasets collected by Netalyzr for Android and ICSIs Certificate Notary, we characterize the certificate root store population present in mobile devices in the wild. Motivated by concerns that bloated root stores increase the attack surface of mobile users, we report on the interplay of certificate sets deployed by the device manufacturers, mobile operators, and the Android OS. We identify certificates installed exclusively by apps on rooted devices, thus breaking the audited and supervised root store model, and also discover use of TLS interception via HTTPS proxies employed by a market research company.

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